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Introduction: Political Mediations in Water Scarcity 
 
Jordan is one of the most water scarce countries in the world, or so goes the 
popular refrain. More than thirty years of scholarship drawing upon political-
economic, critical realist and socio-nature frameworks has essentially 
questioned the Malthusian idea of resource scarcity being driven by population 
growth in most environmental resources sectors from forestry to agriculture to 
bio-diversity (e.g., see Kull 2000, Robins 2011, Peet and Watts 2004). In the 
water sector, however, the notion of socially-unmediated, absolute scarcity 
continues to have remarkable resilience, most persistently in the context of 
water resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Jordan is 
somewhat at the epicenter of the debate, with international donors and research 
communities putting forth significant efforts to understanding and then 
mitigating the consequences of that scarcity (e.g. see USAID 2011, Bonn 2013). 
Most of the research literature on the Jordanian water sector has focused on the 
national- and international-scale dimensions of water politics, supply 
enhancement, management and conservation questions (e.g., see Yorke 2013, 
DAI 2012). In this paper we move beyond the national-scale supply side 
approach towards addressing water security in Jordan and instead highlight the 
politics of access to and control over water.  We focus on the case of water user 
associations (WUAs) in the Jordan Valley (JV), drawing upon insights from a 
series of interviews conducted with farmers and officials working in this arena 
(Figure 1). We furthermore draw upon a series of interviews conducted at the 
policy level in Jordan to contextualize the WUA case study within the larger 
political economy of water management in the country. With the following 
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article, we hope to contribute to the literature on the politics of water scarcity 
across local and national and international scales. 
 
The predominantly national- and international-scale water scholarship on 
Jordan, just as with many other countries, has centered upon the volumetric 
measures of water. Such measures, on the one hand, are the essential currency of 
intersectoral, regional and transboundary water flows and the largely 
technocratic thinking thereupon. On the other hand, they also tend to hide as 
much as they reveal. They hide, in the first instance, the materiality of water as it 
intersects, mostly at the local scale, with human labor and bodies to produce use 
and exchange values. The same cubic meter numbers also tend to hide the 
discursive worlds of meaning, memory, emotion, and connection that humans 
inevitably ascribe to and realize through water (e.g., see Mustafa 2013). Last but 
not least, the big volumetric numbers demand and are given an authenticity and 
authority precisely because they offer a [false] sense of systemic logic to the 
circulation of water through the hydro-social metabolism, with tidy lines 
connecting different parts of the hydrologic system without the interruption of 
the social system (e.g. see Figure 2 as a schematic of the Jordanian water system 
linked to JV by USAID). This manuscript is an attempt at illuminating precisely 
these hidden [social] stories behind the interconnected boxes and circles, which 
represent one construction of water’s reality, through the case study of WUAs. It 
should be noted that WUAs do not even feature on the schematic map in Figure 
2. 
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Of all the international community and donor-driven interventions and 
institutional innovations in Jordan—and there are many—WUAs are the most 
emblematic of the participatory water management ethos popular amongst the 
international water policy community. There is a wealth of literature that exists 
about them in many contexts and while the donor-based literature often 
promotes them as the ultimate conduit for democratization in water resources, 
especially irrigation management (Bandaragoda 1999, Groenfeldt and Svendsen 
1999), much of the scholarly literature is critical of the outcomes realized 
through WUAs (Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 1998, Brown 2011). It has been 
argued elsewhere that there is no such thing as an apolitical, strictly technocratic 
context for water management (e.g. see Zeitoun and Warner 2006). The context 
in Jordan, however, is even more explicitly political and is imbricated with some 
of the most unstable and emotive geopolitical fault lines in the world. With due 
regard to and discussion of that context, we focus on the WUAs to highlight the 
epistemic linkages between the global and local water management landscapes.  
We discuss how the WUA’s reality is refracted not only by the local realities but 
also how those realities are in themselves refracted by the nature of the 
Jordanian state and the international community’s role in sustaining that state. 
WUAs are significant here because they encapsulate the tensions and 
interactions between the local water users, Jordanian water managers and 
international development and donor establishments. 
 
The bigger point of the article is that Jordanian waterscapes cannot be 
understood in isolation from the nature of the Jordanian state and its 
vulnerability to regional, geopolitical seismicity. The rationality of the Jordanian 
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state, as well as that of the Jordanian farmers—which in itself is a contested 
category—is no less legitimate than the rationality of the international donor 
and policy community. Technocratic rationality premised upon absolute water 
scarcity fails to capture the politically inflected rationality of present day water 
use in Jordan. Sooner the gap between the technocratic and political rationality is 
recognized by all, sooner one can move beyond the present stalemate between 
the Jordanian water users, policy makers and their international funders. 
 
Water Politics and Water User Associations 
 
Much of the critical literature on water resources, starting from the 1990s, has 
addressed issues of social power (Mustafa 2002, Swyngedouw 2004, Budds 
2006), gender (Sultana 2009, Halvorson 2003), capitalist accumulation and neo-
liberalism (Bakker 2004), state formation (Swyngedouw 1999) and the social 
construction of knowledge around water, e.g. the hydrologic and hydrosocial 
cycle (Linton 2008, Linton and Budds 2004, Loftus 2007). This article, in the 
same vein as critical water literature, questions who has access to, and control 
over water, by what right, and to what effect in the JV? We try to apprehend the 
new waterscapes being created through the donor induced institutional 
structure of the WUAs in the JV (Adhikari and Goldie 2010). 
 
 
Social capital is perhaps one of the most vexing and elusive concepts to have 
been introduced into the development lexicon over the past two decades (Portes 
and Mooney 2003). Having an intellectual pedigree dating back to the work of 
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Pierre Bourdieu (1986), it was popularized in the so-called mainstream 
development thinking by the work of Robert Putnam et al. (1993) and to a lesser 
extent by James Coleman (1988). Putnam et al.’s (1993: 167) most often cited 
definition of social capital describes it as, “trust norms and networks . . . that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.” Presumably 
in the context of Putnam et al.’s comparative study of economic progress 
between northern and southern Italy, in which the definition is proposed, the 
understanding of “efficiency” is strictly limited to economic efficiency. James 
Coleman (1988: 98), in a less normatively prescriptive mode, argues that: 
 
Social capital is defined by its function.  It is not a single entity but a 
variety of different entities, with two elements in common; they all consist 
of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of 
actors--whether persons or corporate actors--within the structure. 
 
The above definition is agnostic about the function that social capital may serve 
or the form it may take, but links it to social structures and makes its 
functionality contingent upon those structures. Much of the empirical work 
drawing upon the concept of social capital has understood it as trust and norms 
of reciprocity, with horizontal associations as an institutional manifestation of 
those norms and networks (Graeff and Svensden 2013, Sonderskov 2009, 
Putnam 2000, Hakli 2010). 
 
The concept of social capital as generally used and applied in the development 
field has come under considerable criticism, especially the notion of social 
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capital as accumulated norms and networks within a society, (e.g., see Fine 1999 
and 2007). Fine (1999) quite eloquently argues that if social structures are 
indeed arbiters of developmental outcomes, then why bother with the concept of 
social capital that seems to explain everything and then nothing. Bebbington and 
Perrault (2000), through their work in highland Ecuador, establish that 
horizontal associations and collective action is an empirical reality with 
observable impacts, mostly positive on people’s lives and livelihoods.  Therefore, 
such collective action deserves analytic attention under the rubric of social 
capital in a structural context. Foley and Edwards (1999), in their review of 45 
empirical studies using the concept of social capital, offer the comparable insight 
that social capital-based studies drawing upon a more structurally-based 
understanding of the concept, more than the norms and networks-based 
understanding, alert us to the fact that access itself is not enough but rather the 
quantity and more importantly the quality of resources and networks is at issue. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1980 and 1984) originally postulated three interchangeable 
capitals: economic, cultural and social. He argued that social capital that emerges 
from human relationships is in fact deeply embedded in power relations. If 
anything, social capital is one of the main conduits through which power 
relations are reproduced. Holt (2008) further posits that uneven accrual of 
embodied social capital can be understood in conjunction with the differential 
power relations within society.  These power relations are reproduced and 
sometimes resisted as fluctuations of social capital resonate through the 
networks of social relationships that impact individuals and communities. This 
research on WUAs in Jordan seeks to unpack the power relations within which, 
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WUAs are embedded, the quality and type of social capital that manifests itself 
through the WUAs, and how the co-production of WUAs and concomitant social 
capital affects intra- and inter-WUA water distribution and welfare outcomes 
(Ostrom 1996). 
 
Ostrom’s (1990) work on collective action among common-pool resource users 
gave the initial impetus for participatory strategies to more effectively and 
efficiently manage and sustain natural resources. Some literature has further 
supported Ostrom’s line of thinking, suggesting broadly that user participation in 
irrigation water management will lead to more reliable water distribution, a 
reduction in government spending, lower operations and maintenance costs, 
higher collection of water fees, greater agricultural productivity, and 
management benefiting from more incentivized employees, i.e. farmers. (Tang, 
1992; Frederiksen and Vissia, 1998; Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999; IFAD, 2001; 
Lubell et al., 2002; Hamdy, 2004; Vermillion, 2006; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; 
Ghazouani et al., 2012).  
 
Some country-level case studies and meta-analyses of regional WUAs have 
supported the claims of the superiority of WUAs over other government or 
private management schemes (Vermillion, 1997; Ostrom, 2002; Qiao et al., 2009; 
Uysal and Atis, 2010; Huang et al., 2010; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010). Yet others 
have raised serious doubts about the prospects for WUAs. These doubts spring 
from inconclusive outcomes of WUA performance to date (Akkuzu et al., 2007; 
Yami, 2013; Bhatt, 2013), insufficient efforts towards preparing the political, 
legal and social environment within the overarching government for a change to 
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WUA management (Tang, 1992; de Graaf and van den Toorn, 1994; Frederiksen 
and Vissia, 1998; Meizen-Dick, 2007; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Hodgson, 
2009; Ghazouani et al., 2012; Suhardiman, 2013), and a lack of desire among 
farmers to fully support this change for fear of a greater financial burden or lack 
of the necessary management skills and capacities (Vermillion, 1991; de Graaf 
and van den Toorn, 1994; IFAD, 2001; Hamdy, 2004; Garces-Restrepo et al., 
2007).  
 
Some of the critical literature on WUAs more importantly questions if the focus 
should be solely on physical and tangible improvements in the performance, 
production and efficiency of the water supply or whether there is a social 
development aspect to this entire endeavor as well (Groenfeldt, 1998; 
Vermillion, 1991; Plusquellec, 2002; Ghazouani et al., 2012). The question arises 
as to whether goals should include and even prioritize farmer equity, 
empowerment and maintaining a voice as well as gender participation. It has 
been noted in several cases that WUAs can simply re-establish existing and 
unequal power relations between groups in a given environment as well as be a 
conduit for gender-based exclusion (Cleaver, 1999; Mollinga et al., 2007; 
Adhikari and Goldie, 2010; Bhatt, 2013; Kemerink et al., 2013; Meinzen-Dick and 
Zwarteween 1998; Veldwisch and Mollinga, 2013). We will be engaging with the 
promises and perils of WUAs in Jordan below, mindful of the larger 
developmental objectives that they could help address. But before we do that we 
would like to briefly elucidate the methodological basis of our data collection and 
subsequent analysis. 
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The interview/ethnographic data discussed in this manuscript is based upon a 
series of key informant interviews conducted in Amman, Jordan in November 
2013 and in the JV in the summer of 2014. The interviews in Amman were 
conducted with key personnel related to the Jordanian water sector including 
functionaries of the Jordanian Ministry of Water (MWI), Water Authority of 
Jordan (WAJ), international donor representatives, prominent NGOs, academics 
and researchers. The ten interviews were directed towards understanding the 
issues and politics surrounding water development and management in Jordan 
at the national level. In the JV again, primarily water users as owner operator, 
tenant and contract farmers were interviewed starting from the northern JV all 
the way to the southern end of it by the Dead Sea. A total of twenty three 
interviews in the JV along with the policy interviews in Amman lasted between a 
minimum of one hour to three hours. The interviews were supplemented with 
participant observation, particularly in the JV and where interactions were often 
with groups of farmers or decision makers, which were frequently joined by 
people passing by or curious onlookers. The farmer interviews were based upon 
convenience sampling, while the Amman interviews were purposive. 
Furthermore, the findings of the interviews were also triangulated with an 
extensive literature review delving into the wealth of gray literature on the topic 
as well as relatively more parsimonious published  work. 
 
The interviews were in an ethnographic mode, where the concern was not with a 
large representative sample but rather with the intensive deeper interactions. 
The ethnographies were directed to get to the respondents’ experiences and 
subjective views on the range of water related problems they face and their 
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perception of the causes. The ethnographic approach derives its strength not 
from the representativeness of the sample but rather from the depth and quality 
of interactions and the strength of analysis (Silverman 2001,  Hoggart et al. 
2002). Since the research was in a somewhat critical realist mode, the focus was 
more on a relational understanding the structural and discursive causes of the 
empirical reality instead of just the contours of it, as would have been 
appropriate with a more extensive formal questionnaire based research design 
(Sayer 1992). The key analytical method for the qualitative data was, therefore, 
theory driven interpretation of the results. The core research problem of the 
manuscript on multiple meanings of water helped identify key words, phrases 
and structures of argument that spoke to the problem (Silverman 2001). The 
narratives were subjected to theory driven interpretation with reference to the 
prior conceptual literature on WUAs and water in general, and topically on 
Jordan in particular. The multiple strands of explanation, nuance and the mutual 
tension between multiple interpretations of the respondents’ that emerged from 
the ethnographic data, reflect the lived reality of WUA in the JV, and is 
represented accordingly in the narrative below. 
 
The unbearable politics of water in Jordan 
 
Water is not just politicized in Jordan—it is politics. The exceptional political 
valence of water cannot be appreciated without an understanding of the nature 
of the Jordanian state and society. The former Ottoman province of Trans-Jordan 
became a British mandate post WWI in 1922 and eventually the independent 
Hashmite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. The subsequent defining events in the 
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history of Jordan were the ones that happened outside of its formal borders—the 
formation of the state of Israel in 1948, Jordan’s defeat at the hands of Israel in 
1967, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 
2011. The first two events resulted in a massive refugee influx into Jordan 
resulting in almost half of the population hailing from the west bank of the 
Jordan River. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria also resulted in a substantial influx 
of refugees, further increasing the pressure on Jordan’s water resources (Mercy 
Corps 2014). Until 1970, the Palestinian population of the country was 
politically-dominant, represented by various Palestinian insurgent groups, the 
main amongst them being the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The 
Jordanian state headed by King Hussein reclaimed control over the country in 
the aftermath of the brutal Black September conflict against the PLO in 1970. 
Since then, Jordanian society has settled into an unofficial truce of sorts in which 
the indigenous Jordanians populate the state institutions and the Palestinian 
populace dominates the business and commercial life of the country. Water 
poverty in Jordan is often blamed by the Jordanian officials on the refugee influx 
in the country since 1948, in the absence of which there would have been more 
than twice as much water per-capita than is presently the case. Water has, 
therefore, emerged as one of the lynchpins of maintaining the stability of the 
state within the above context. 
 
To assert its legitimacy through economic and political integration, the 
Hashemite regime early on initiated programmes for the resettlement of 
Palestinian refugees and sedentarization of pastoral Bedouin communities. 
Centralized planning of water services was critical in allowing state penetration 
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into rural, arid and unsettled areas (Van Aken et al, 2008). Government subsidies 
and loans were also key to expanding commercial agriculture from the JV to the 
highlands, where it now far exceeds the acreage under customary rainfed 
agriculture (Venot and Molle 2008).  By the 1990s groundwater irrigation in the 
highlands had expanded significantly thanks to private investors, so much so 
that the Azraq Oasis’ Ramsar wetland in eastern Jordan underwent an ecological 
collapse. More recently the groundwater abstraction from largely illegal private 
wells is estimated to be lowing the groundwater level by about 1m/year (Van 
Aken et al. 2008, Ministry of Water and Irrigation 2013). Attempts to restrict 
pumping through higher prices were ineffective, as were crop based water 
quotas, mostly because most pumping was illegal anyway. The groundwater 
decline in the highlands has reached a crisis level and the government is making 
desperate attempts to limit the pumping, but very powerful interests are 
typically at play. The task of limiting groundwater pumping is further 
complicated by the fact that most wealthy landowners are disinterested in 
economic productivity and complex farm management.  They instead use the 
land for prestige agriculture, often with fruit orchards encasing a villa and 
swimming pool for weekend leisure (Van Aken et al. 2009). 
 
Jordan is already using 98% of its treated wastewater in agriculture to reallocate 
freshwater for domestic purposes. The influx of 1.2 million Syrian refugees since 
2011 has further exacerbated the picture especially in the northern 
governorates, where there has occurred some tension over water between local 
and refugee populations (Ministry of Water and Irrigation 2013). Jordanian 
water managers have pinned their hopes on mega-projects such as fossil 
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groundwater transfer from the Disi Aquifer in the south to Amman, and the 
desalinated water from the Red Sea to Dead Sea water conveyor. Nevertheless 
50% of the water in the domestic sector is lost from leakages, illegal connections 
and technical losses (UN Human Rights Council 2014). It is certainlymay be more 
cost effective than the mega-projects to address these systems losses as well as 
to control illegal pumping in the highlands (Hagan 2008). The state, however, 
has to maintain service delivery and tariffs within socially acceptable limits and 
sometimes turn a blind eye to system leakages even if just the water subsidy 
costs the government around 1% of the GDP (Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
2013). Jordan is moving towards addressing some of the institutional and 
structural problems in the water sector under pressure from international 
donors, but the progress continues to be slow. 
 
The above mentioned international literature has done a reasonable job of 
documenting the politics and policy distortions in the Jordanian water sector. 
But as Bonn (2013) notes, it is precisely the type of emphasis on demand side 
management and economic rationality that has somewhat isolated the donors, 
and donor-related actors from the water establishment in Jordan. The Jordanian 
officialdom was not averse to confirming their preference for supply side 
interventions and resentment towards donor emphasis on institutional reform: 
 
To me our priority is infrastructure development and we are not very 
receptive to institutional change type projects, e.g., we think that the 
USAID funded ISSP [Institutional Support and Strengthening Program] 
project is a waste of time. I do not deny the utility of having transparent 
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institutional blocks doing their job, but I don’t think that the type of 
institutional compartmentalization that the ISSP project is pushing is the 
way forward (A senior MWI operative, 17th Nov. 2013) 
 
What we expect from donors is infrastructure and water treatment 
facilities. We love JICA because they don’t go for the wishy-washy 
institutional stuff and ask us to change things. They just put down the 
infrastructure and move on. We appreciate that (A senior MWI operative, 
12th Nov. 2013). 
 
Beyond the inevitable infrastructure bias of the water engineering 
establishment, some independent observers also concede the wisdom of 
attention to the supply side because of the frequent spikes in population from 
continuous waves of refugees: 
 
All the water models we have done for Jordan point towards demand 
management, whereas the country aspires to have supply enhancements. 
Donors too don’t want to fund supply enhancement. . . . Reality is that if we 
had heeded the demand management angle in the past, we would have 
been in very serious trouble right now with the huge influx of refugees 
from Iraq and then Syria. So I guess what was a mistake according to 
donors is saving us right now (An independent water researcher, 19th, 
Nov. 2013). 
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The issue is not just economic return from the water investment but more 
importantly about political stability. From groundwater mining in the highlands 
of the country to the usage of water-intensive crops to turning a blind eye to 
non-revenue water--political stability is the premier value driving these water 
management issues in the country: 
 
Political stability is one amongst other objectives of water management, 
e.g., economic return on water and long term sustainability. But if you take 
political stability out of any equation of objectives, you are really talking 
nonsense in the Jordanian context. I guess what I am calling for is 
realpolitik in the water sector (A senior water policymaker 18th, Nov. 
2013). 
 
It is not just about line losses from the infrastructure but also from the fact 
that people don’t pay their water bills, particularly in the aftermath of the 
Arab spring. Somehow since the Arab spring we can see it in the data that 
people are paying less and less of their water bills. This is reflected in 
other sectors too. Since the Arab spring more and more people are driving 
around Amman without paying their vehicle registration fee. Our minister 
is rightly concerned about the link between governance and water, 
because it is critical, especially since the Arab spring (A senior MWI 
operative, 17th, Nov. 2013). 
 
The concern with political stability is also wedded to the classic post-colonial 
concern with nation-building and modernist trappings of developmentalism, 
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especially as they may be reflected through land settlement and water 
development. The Jordan Valley in particular is a venue for such nation-building 
particularly since it is across the border from the highly-affluent,  
technologically-sophisticated, and western (self-proclaimed) country of Israel: 
 
This country does have an idealized view of agriculture where they, 
imitating the Israelis--wanted to settle down the pastoralist population to 
build a nation. Now they are continuing with that inertia. In fact, there is a 
strong sense of competition with the Israelis. They think that if they 
[Israelis] can do it, so can they. I mean they have lamps on roads in the 
middle of nowhere just so that Jordan may gleam like Israel from the sky 
(An expatriate water expert 17th Nov. 2013). 
 
In the JV if you look over the border the Israelis have planted date palms 
and the Jordanians want to do the same. In fact, the King and some of his 
partners had date farms down there and they made some very good 
money. So I guess they are going to move towards that, not sure just 
because they want to compete with the Israelis. Perhaps it is just more 
profitable to do so (An expatriate water expert 19th Nov. 2013). 
 
The crop mix along with the policies of making the desert bloom are largely 
informed by the nation-building ethos of the Jordanian state. The Jordanian state 
has a very centralized structure with most of the power concentrated with the 
royal family.  The royal family in turn depends upon patronage politics with the 
local tribes and appeasement of the powerful Palestinian commercial interests.  
 17 
It is in this context that the following narrative of WUAs and water development 
in the JV must be understood. The WUAs in the JV are a prime example of donor-
driven institutional innovationand induced social capital. How this institutional 
innovationat induced social capital carves out a space for its’ functioning within 
the techno-political environment of Jordan in general and the JV in particular is 
the discussion to which we now turn. 
 
The Techno-waterscapes of the Jordan Valley 
 
The Jordan Rift Valley, which encapsulates the wider basin of the Jordan River, is 
located between Jordan and Israel/PalestineWest Bank, extending from the area 
of Lake Tiberias/Sea of Galilee to Aqaba, located at the very southern point of 
Jordan on the Red Sea (Figure 1).  This paper is primarily concerned with the 
portion of the Jordan Rift Valley on the Jordanian side running from the 
northwest corner of Jordan to the Dead Sea, which will be referred to simply as 
the Jordan Valley (JV). There are farms and water user associations located 
below the Dead Sea that are not herein part of the main discussion.  The JV is 
over 300 meters below sea level and makes for an ideal climate that allows for 
year round agriculture. 
  
There are four main sources of water for agriculture in the JV: surface water 
from the Yarmouk River, spring and well water, treated wastewater and runoff 
water that is stored in dams.  According to its agreement with Israel, Jordan 
takes a portion of the water from the Yarmouk River, which runs between Jordan 
and Syria and then empties into the Jordan River.  Jordan also now buys a 
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portion of the water from Lake Tiberias from Israel.  Fresh springs and wells are 
located in the northwest corner of Jordan and they are exploited for water use, 
with many farmers also using wells on their farms.  Treated wastewater now 
represents an important source of water for farmers.  Wastewater from Amman 
and Zarqa is transferred to the Khirbat as-Samra treatment plant, after which the 
treated water flows through the Zarqa river basin to the King Talal Dam and then 
on to the JV.  Finally, there are many dams that have been built along the side 
wadis [, or valleys], of the JV and these help to capture winter rain water runoff 
(Figure 2). 
 
The King Abdullah Canal (KAC) isacts as the main apparatus for water 
transportation in the JV.  It is roughly 110 kilometers long and has pumping 
stations along its length to siphon water to the adjacent farmlands.  The KAC 
holds freshwater (water from the Yarmouk River, Lake Tiberias, springs/wells 
and dams) for about 65 kilometers from its beginning to the central town of Deir 
Alla.  At Deir Alla, the portion of freshwater not allocated to agriculture is 
pumped up to Amman and used for drinking water.  The lower half of the KAC 
transfers treated wastewater only. Along the very last portion of the KAC, for 
roughly 15 kilometers, water from Kafrein dam, and fresh springs is transported 
to farmland. A unique feature of the canal is that it is simultaneously a 
conveyance as well as a storage structure for water. This is an important feature 
that must be borne in mind as the narrative progresses. 
  
According to the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), the government agency 
responsible for water distribution to farmers in the JV, the water that is being 
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held in the KAC at any point in time ranges from 500,000 to 800,000 cubic 
meters.  The water depth in the canal ranges from 1.6 to 2 meters.  The storage 
capacity in the KAC allows the JVA to open and close gates along its length to 
serve supply needs at any point in time and to regulate its flow more effectively.  
Water in the KAC is closely monitored and controlled from the JVA Control 
Center in Deir Alla with a SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) 
system.  This computer program can view in real-time the level and flow of the 
water in the KAC from the various gauges along its length.  It should be noted 
that not all of the gauges are working so it is not completely accurate and 
reliable. Nevertheless, the important point is that there is a fairly sophisticated 
system at work to distribute water for irrigation purposes in the JV. 
  
After the water is siphoned from the KAC at the pump stations (PS) located along 
its length, water is further distributed either by the force of gravity, or with 
pumps.  Water flows through main and lateral lines to reach individual farm 
units.  Each farm unit has a Farm Turnout Assembly (FTA), which includes a flow 
regulator, a flow limiter, and sometimes a water meter.  The flow limiter is 
supposed to ensure a constant flow anywhere from 6 to 12 liters per second, 
depending on the area of the farm, the crop pattern, and the specificities of the 
general area of water distribution.  Water meters were originally installed in all 
FTAs but many have been broken for various reasons.  After water enters a farm 
through the FTA, it is the farmer’s business as to how it is used. 
 
Citrus, vegetables, date palm trees and bananas are the main crops planted in the 
Jordan Valley. Medjool data palms in particular are gaining acreage, mostly in the 
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southern region of the valley. Needless to say, all of these crops require 
significant irrigation throughout the year. The government’s reluctance to 
enforce quota reductions for water-intensive crops such as citrus and bananas 
and its inability or lack of motivation to prevent water theft from the KAC 
reflects a clear valuation of political concessions above water conservation and 
economic considerations. 
 
Water development in the JV, just as in the rest of Jordan, is an exercise in 
political appeasement. Crop-based quotas were frozen in 1991, limiting banana 
and citrus orchards eligible for higher water quotas to those already cultivated 
and recognized (Molle and Venot, 2008). However, due to political pressure from 
the Ghazawi tribe, prominent in the North of the Valley, the JVA violated this 
policy in 2004 when it recognized illegal citrus orchards that had been planted 
on lands receiving the water quota for vegetables (Molle and Venot, 2008). In 
addition to securing higher water quotas, influential tribes such as the Adwan 
tribe in the south of the JV have also successfully pressured the government into 
maintaining tariffs on imported bananas (Van Aken et al, 2009). As one farmer in 
the JV noted: 
 
Those banana plantations are owned by the big/powerful guys; there is 
water for them.  There is no water for the smaller, weak farmers. The 
water problem is for the small guys and the weak guys (A Jordan Valley 
Farmer, 20/08/2014). 
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Molle and Venot (2008) remark that such policies institutionalize inequity in 
access to water and serve to further dissuade citrus and banana farmers from 
switching to more water-efficient crops. Furthermore, turning a blind eye to 
water theft at the WUA level as well as the individual farmer level removes any 
legitimacy of the JVA to enforce the rules. Pipes sunk into the KAC to pump water 
illegally are ubiquitous features of the JV waterscape (Figure 3). But law 
enforcement will mean depriving powerful people of important extra revenue. 
And as Courcier and Guerin (2004) warn, if farm revenues were substantially 
reduced without compensation, there could be social and political unrest, 
tampering and destruction of water monitoring devices, corruption and bribing 
of officials, and many farmers may just default on water payments. The WUAs 
are emerging as a main conduit through which these tensions can be negotiated 
and we give an overview of those below. 
 
Overview of WUAs in the Jordan Valley Waterscape 
 
The WUAs are organized around pump stations (PS) in the JV. The pump stations 
have numbers corresponding to the kilometer distance from the head of the KAC. 
WUAs are frequently referred to by the number of the PS on which, they are 
organized, e.g. WUA at PS 28, PS 33, etc. This is how WUAs will be referred to in 
subsequent discussions. Every pump station has three to four actual pumping 
units and the WUA offices are typically located near the pumping apparatus. The 
pumps are within the jurisdiction of the JVA while everything downstream from 
that is within the WUA’s jurisdiction, except for some maintenance activities that 
continue to be the JVA’s responsibility. The WUAs are limited to distributing the 
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water among farm units, giving out violations for tampering with the 
infrastructure or taking water out-of-turn, and somewhat informally negotiating 
the water order or schedule of allocations with the JVA.. 
 
The Water User Associations (WUAs) in the JV were initiated and implemented 
by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the German 
development agency, in 2001.  These WUAs were established with the stated and 
official intent of making water distribution for agriculture in the JV more 
efficient, technically and financially, as well more effective in managing the day-
to-day activities. While the intent of donors may have been to promote 
participatory water management in the JV, the actual impetus for farmers to join 
the WUAs was often fear of the privatization of water and consequently higher 
costs of water, as well as subsidized irrigation piping in some cases: 
 
Some people were scared that WUAs were going to become a private 
company – but slowly the fears of privatization went away. The French 
agency gave pipes to individuals. French paid for 70% and members 30% 
and if not a member then 40% to incentivize people to join and get pipes 
for cheaper [in 2008]. In general, the water association looked better and 
better organized, so other farmers wanted to join (A farmer at PS 33, Circa 
Aug. 2014). 
 
The actual implementation of the WUAs began in 2002 in a gradual fashion 
throughout the JV.  The first associations were established in the north and every 
year, new associations were created.  In the beginning, this would simply mean 
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that a president was chosen and the WUA was created essentially in name only.  
None of the WUAs took on any substantial responsibilities for water distribution 
until 2008.  Each WUA has a contract with the JVA that details the duties of the 
JVA and the WUA. The contract also specifies , as well as the budget of the WUA 
that is supplied by the JVA andwhich covers the salaries for the WUA employees, 
basic administrative costs, and light maintenance costs (if the WUA has 
maintenance duties). 
 
Each WUA administers an area of land anywhere from 3660 to 15735 dunums (1 
hectare = 10 dunums), or 56 to 374 farm units, with each farm unit covering 
roughly 35 dunums.  Every WUA has a president, an official (who might be an 
engineer) responsible for the technical distribution of water, and a cadre of 
ditchriders, or those who monitor the lateral lines and open and close them 
according to the water schedule .  Membership in the WUA’s general council, or 
main body, is voluntary; membership varies, with some WUAs having almost 
100% membership and others with only a minor percentage of the farmers 
included.  There is usually a one-time joining fee and in some WUAs, there is also 
a monthly or yearly fee.  The general council elects a smaller group of farmers to 
the administrative council, which handles any important decisions throughout 
the year and is also responsible for electing the president.  The number of 
farmers in the administrative council depends on the internal rules of the WUA.  
Members of the general council usually only attend a yearly update meeting and 
meetings in which, elections for the administrative council are held. 
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There are 28 WUAs established to date [winter 2015], including those within the 
aforementioned region below the Dead Sea. Only 13 WUAs have taken on water 
distribution responsibilities, which simply means making sure that the water 
travels from the KAC intake point to the individual farmers and that lateral lines 
are opened according to the set water schedule. Each functioning WUA is also 
responsible for monitoring the lateral lines and making sure that farmers are not 
taking water out-of-turn.  The JVA still establishes the water order, i.e. the 
quantity and timing of water distribution between water users, but the WUA 
implements it.  Some of the WUAs have also taken on light maintenance tasks, 
meaning that they can repair small problems with the FTAs., but Llarger 
maintenance tasks are, however, still under the purview of the JVA.  Yet other 
WUAs are still in the process of being established, and either do not have a full 
working core of WUA employees, or are simplywith some also not officially 
registered with the Jordan Cooperative Council. While the original intent may 
have been to transfer greater responsibility to the WUAs, there is a wide gap 
between this ambition and the reality on the ground. 
 
WUAs are stymied bywith a lack of substantive power due to their unclear legal 
and political status (ISSP 2013). There are also concerns among JVA staff over 
their job security if a majority of their tasks were to be transferred to the WUAs.  
This could be the potential impetus for delays in expanding WUA 
responsibilities., Iin particular delays in addressing some of the enforcement and 
rational water use issues could be accounted for by this fear. Such insecurities at 
times lead to open hostility towards the WUAs on part of some JVA employees: 
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There are more problems with the associations than in areas without 
them. There are no problems with water management up to the pump 
[JVA’s mandate].  The problem is within the field area where water gets 
distributed to farmers.  There are more problems between farmers and 
stealing happens (A JVA official at the stage office for PS 21-41, 
20/08/2014). 
 
Other more senior JVA officials are, however, more receptive towards the WUAs 
as they lessen their workload: 
 
The water user association is the best. I’m not looking out for my own 
interests but for the general interest. Some Directors really want to be 
king and want power, which is why they don’t want the associations to be 
successful and take away some of their power.  But for me, I am happy to 
have the associations take away some of the burden from me; farmers no 
longer come here en masse to complain; they go to the association 
president and that is better for me, [because of] less time that I have to 
spend on that (A senior JVA official, 26/08/2014). 
 
The JVA has not allowed WUAs to collect water tariffs from farmers and 
discourages them from carrying out activities to generate additional income 
(ISSP 2013). Current task transfer agreements are limited and hardly cover 
operational staff salaries, with very little funding for administrative and 
maintenance costs (ISSP 2013).  
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Farmers pay a 50 JD upfront membership fee, 40 JD of which is for shares 
in the bank, and over the course of several years the shares amount has to 
increase to 200 JD.  The WUA doesn’t have much money, it usually just 
breaks even. We have a contract with the JVA that only applies to the 
salaries of the employees. Right now the one problem is that the WUA is 
not profitable, we need an alternative income source, we have many 
ambitions but first we need money [for those ambitions] (WUA official at 
PS 55, circa Aug. 2014). 
 
This lack of financial autonomy is one of the biggest question marks on the long 
term sustainability of the WUAs, as was confirmed by many of the respondents 
during our fieldwork: 
 
No, none of the WUAs could survive [without donor funding] as they have 
salaries to pay. None of the employees are going to work without a salary 
and this comes from the contract with the JVA.  I don’t see self-
sustainability/complete independence possible in the future (WUA official 
at PS 41, circa Aug. 2014). 
 
The salaries for the actual WUA staff are in fact paid by the JVA through a fund 
set up by the donors. USAID proposed a series of training sessions to bolster the 
capacity of WUAs to take on more tasks but political and legal struggles must 
first be addressed to soothe adverse power dynamics in transition. At the 
moment, some WUAs have become extensions of powerful interests in a 
transactional relationship with the state through the JVA. It is this dynamic along 
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with how the WUAs become a conduit for the conduct of politics through water 
that we now turn in the following section. 
  
The State, WUAs, and “Farmers” in the Jordan Valley 
 
Beyond the concept and formal institutional arrangement of WUAs, in practice 
they are also suffused with the type of political machinations documented at the 
macro-scale in the previous section. Van Aken et al. (2009) suggest that 
agricultural rights and development in the JV have traditionally been distributed 
in a system of rents and patronage to constituencies loyal to the King. Powerful 
Bedouin tribes, such as the aforementioned Adwan and Ghazawi tribes, are 
rewarded for their loyalty and support in maintaining political stability (Van 
Aken et al, 2009). It is no coincidence, then, that when the WUAs as an instance 
of induced social capital are superimposed on such a social landscape, they 
inevitably reflect the social realities. The presidents of the WUAs in the north of 
the valley with strong tribal structures tend to inevitably also be tribal leaders 
who are elected more by consensus than any real elections. In fact, one of the 
main benefits of joining a WUA is to gain formal patronage of the association 
president to improve one’s access to water both collectively and individually: 
 
WUA at PS 28 got more water because of ‘wasta’ [connections] with some 
higher JVA people. We complained about not getting the same extra 
amount of water. In the end, PS 33 was able to get the same extra water 
that PS 28 was getting. So our president of PS 33 had the ability to go to 
the ‘big guys’ as well to get what our area needed. He talked to higher-level 
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people at the Ministry [MWI] and in turn was also given a two hour 
extension on the water time. WUAs collectively have more power than 
individual farmers so it is worth being a member. Presidents are strong 
with power and influence in every WUA, though ‘wasta’ levels vary . . . In 5 
years there have been no [water related] problems [within the WUA] – our 
WUA President is elected through consensus rather than elections and is 
esteemed (A WUA official at PS 33, 16/08/2014). 
 
Such formalization of patronage through WUAs is a common critique of 
participatory models of resource management as mentioned above. Many in the 
field argued that patronage is part of the Jordanian culture. They argue that 
accountability, which is supposed to be the lynchpin for the success of the WUA 
model, simply does not exist. This is because of the patronage based ethos of the 
smaller farmers, and because of the massive power differentials between 
farmers, e.g.: 
 
There is no accountability in the associations. If the farmer has a problem 
with a JVA ditchrider, he can complain to the JVA and something is done so 
there is accountability.  But in an association, a farmer has no one to 
complain to about a WUA employee so there is less accountability (Farmer 
at PS 41, 20/08/2014). 
 
The point of the above farmer is that almost all of the employees of a WUA are 
hired based upon their tribal and familial linkages to the WUA president and 
therefore, the accountability of those employees is likely to be minimal. In fact, 
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we came across instances of people complaining about the competence of the 
ditchriders and engineers in WUAs, suggesting in somewhat unambiguous terms 
that they have their jobs because of wasta and not because of any specific skills: 
 
Technical specialists here are not trained well  - the one here [pointing to 
the engineer sitting there] is trained for window metal works not water 
engineering. Ditchriders are illiterate and can’t read meters or write 
violations. As long as there is aid and support there will be an association, 
not afterwards (Farmer at PS 33, 17/08/2014). 
 
Furthermore, the ditchriders, at times in front of us, tended to make light of 
angry farmers coming into the WUA offices to complain about maintenance 
issues affecting their water access (Figure 4). The ditchriders protested lack of 
time as a reason for not following up with the JVA about the farmers’ complaint, 
whilst they had been touring around and having tea with us all day. Even then 
the same farmer also acknowledged that he would have been lost without the 
WUA because he would have had to spend the entire day at the JVA office to get 
his problem solved, to no avail. 
 
Despite the evidence of such disfunctionality, on balance it seemed that the 
farmers, particularly the smaller farmers, deemed WUAs more accessible and 
more able to prevent water thefts and ensure system maintenance than the JVA: 
 
Before the association it was the big powerful people that got their water. 
A farmer could steal water when the JVA wasn’t looking . . . Now, with the 
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WUA’s presence and my personal presence there is monitoring in the field. 
I am a member of a monitoring council, which monitors the behavior of 
the association. . . Just the other day, the ditchriders gave me a violation 
because my son was removing the flow limiter to clean it. There was a 
water turn but water wasn’t coming, so my son wanted to clean it, but 
because it’s the ditchrider’s job to clean the FTA and not the farmer’s, he 
got a violation. My son didn’t know this regulation but I am not angry 
because now everyone knows they are not supposed to do that (A small 
tenant farmer PS 95. 24/08/2014). 
 
The association just doesSome WUAs perform maintenance on the 
FTAfarm turnout assembly as in case of PS 95.  Before, when there were 
no WUAs, the JVA had a very large area to covermaintain for maintenance.  
There was just one team in the JVA northern directorate for maintenance 
from Addassiya to PS 41 [a very large area] so if anyone had a problem, it 
might be a long time before it was solved. Now the WUA has this smaller 
area to look after and it can respond faster and at least alert the JVA more 
quickly about a maintenance issue that has arisen (Farmer on PS 33. Circa 
Aug. 2014). 
 
The president was out here until 2 a.m. the other day to help farmers so he 
is good and active in helping farmers (Farmer on PS 28, Circa Aug. 2014). 
 
The key efficacy of the WUAs as envisaged in the original formulation is to 
intercede on behalf of the farmer within the JVA bureaucracy. There, at least, the 
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WUA is more accessible to farmers even if the responsiveness is variable based 
upon the strength of the tribal structure and one’s proximity to the centres of 
power within that structure, e.g., in the cases of PS 28, 33, Rama and Kafrein 
WUAs, to name a few. In other WUAs where there were multiple tribes vying for 
influence, sometimes the WUA simply fell apart because the multiple kinship 
based groups could not work together, e.g., in, e.g., PS 50. Farmers in the areas 
where there were no WUAs seemed to think that WUA areas were better off than 
them, even if they maintained that it was easier to bribe and steal water from the 
JVA in the absence of a WUA. 
 
Farmer 1: The association is much better than the JVA, because it is closer 
to farmers. They can demand more water hours and the WUA works for 
them. At the association sometimes they run the pumps at night to make 
sure farmers get their water. There is no paying attention to farmers’ 
specific needs here under the JVA . . . But in general I get the water I need. 
 
JVA official: Well he thinks that because he steals water.  
 
Farmer 1: The employees of the government have a very low salary, so we 
support their salaries by helping them out here and there. We give them a 
little bit of money for gas for their bikes. You want the reality right? We 
give bribes to get more water . . . The bribe isn’t for more hours of water, 
it’s to allow the farmer to get away with putting in a bigger flow limiter 
and thus being able to take more liters per second of water during a 
regular turn. 
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Farmer 2: I have no water because I don’t pay bribes. . . But if there was an 
association….There is a particular family and they own many farm units 
here, so they would just end up dominating the association. It’s part of the 
reason why we can’t decide on a president. 
 
Farmer 1: With an association [at least] you would have someone here to 
impose order, but here we like and live by the chaos. 
 
The above exchange at PS 50 on 20/08/2014 encapsulates the tension between 
the desire for accessibility and relative order that may emerge through WUAs, 
and the fear of domination by more powerful farmers that couldmay also be an 
outcome in the social environment of the Jordan Valley. 
 
In the south of the JV, there are more investors coming down from Amman and 
other areas to start growing medjool date palms, which require a steep 
investment in the first few years but yield better long-term profits. These 
farmers stand in contrast to the many other mostly small-scale vegetable 
farmers, although a few vegetables farmers also own more extensive plots of 
land.    What is concerning is that within this diverse farmer setting, as in PS 91, 
WUA membership can be quite low.  In PS 91, there are only around 40 
members as opposed to hundreds of members in other WUAs throughout the JV. 
While it might seem reasonable that large farmers would have an interest in 
being a part of the WUA, many of them are actually relatively disinterested in 
the workings of the WUAs.  They still tend to get their requisite water all the 
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same, either by stealing or just casually approaching the WUA or JVA directly. In 
situations such as this, the efficacy of the WUA is relatively limited and the 
general impression was that tenants (Egyptians or Pakistanis most of the time), 
as well as owners, were happy enough with the workings of the WUA--, when 
they knew about its existence., Sbecause such powerful people got their way, 
with or without the WUA, anyway. 
 
In our WUA there are 244 farming units, 145 farmers in total and 75 
farmers are WUA members. It’s just the palm farmers who haven’t joined 
for the most part, as they only need water and don’t care to get involved 
past that. Palm farming only really started in earnest in the last five years. 
The palm farmers always owned the land and have recently taken the land 
back from renters to grow palms. There are 71 farm units of palm trees 
this year and there were 47 units last year of palm trees so the increase 
has been rapid (A WUA official at PS 95. 24/08/2014). 
 
The verdict on WUAs in the JV is mixed as a result of the foregoing discussion. In 
more tribal regions the WUAs become conduits for imposing tribal discipline and 
patronage upon the water users. In regions with multiple tribal loyalties, the 
WUAs were either dysfunctional or less functional than others. In more 
commercial farmer-dominated regions, the WUAs were largely present to 
enforce rules on smaller farmers, as the large commercial farmers seemed to get 
away with what they wanted. The most important criteria distinguishing the 
efficacy of one WUA from the other was the ability of the WUA president of the 
WUA to negotiate compensatory water turns for the WUA in case water timings 
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were missed because of electricity or equipment failure. The second most 
important criteria seemed to be to get favourable changes in the water order, 
officially or unofficially, as illustrated in case of PS 28. On balance the farmers did 
appreciate the greater accessibility and responsiveness, however imperfect,,, 
that had emerged infrom the WUAs.  
 
The functionality of the WUAs is also deeply imbricated with the geopolitics and 
political culture of Jordan. The local farmers are not oblivious to the fact that 
they are benefiting from more water from the KAC right now because of the 
conflict in Syria, which frees up water from Syrian agriculture. They are also 
somewhat painfully mindful of the fact that water coming from the Yarmouk is a 
Faustian bargain legitimizing Israel’s disproportionate appropriation of the 
Jordan River valley water to the relatively small advantage of Jordan (also see 
Beaumont 1997): 
 
Note that Israel takes too large a share of the river water from Jordan and 
this isn’t fair. Here there is no water, thanks to Israel. We complain about 
water and everything else but no one listens, no one is getting the message 
in the West (A small farmer, PS 28. Circa Aug. 2014).  
 
The cropping decisions in the valley are also not independent of the ongoing 
wars in Iraq and Syria.  There are cheaper agricultural products in Saudi Arabia 
that make for competition for Jordanian farmers and it is also difficult for 
Jordanian farmers to export due to the frequent closure of the Iraqi and Syrian 
borders to trade, and the difficulty of traversing the Israeli administered 
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territory to reach customary regional and international markets. The attraction 
of the medjool date palms is partially an outcome of that geopolitical reality, as 
reported by many vegetable farmers in the valley.  
 
Stepping down from the geopolitics, though, there are the centralized patronage-
based domestic politics of the Jordanian state within which the WUAs are 
embedded. We repeatedly challenged complaining farmers with the question of 
why they do not hold their WUA leadership accountable if they are not happy 
with the job they are doing. Very rarely did a farmer ever seem to understand the 
concept of holding the leadership accountable; instead, most kept insisting upon 
the president doing his job. The following exchange with a Jordanian farmer and 
Pakistani farmer should illustrate the point (PS 91. Circa Aug. 2014): 
 
Jordanian Farmer: In Jordan, we like to sit in chairs and have power. 
Instead, the president needs to be going to the field to find out what 
farmers need. 
 
Pakistani Farmer: Well it’s obviously not being done right now….and you 
still have to go to the JVA to ask for more water.  
 
Jordanian farmer: If members want to protect the association, then the 
president has to act for the needs of the farmers. The association is a 
million times better, but we need a strong president. The ditchriders don’t 
have power, so it’s not their fault. . . .The association at its core should be 
working to the advantage of farmers. When one of the wealthy guys comes 
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into the WUA office, then he is warmly welcomed and given tea, but if 
there are poor farmers in trouble the president will shoo them away.  
 
Pakistani farmer: They should be dealing with people with respect, there 
shouldn’t be a difference between the big and the small. This [disrespect] 
never happened with the JVA. [an aside to the authors in Urdu] Farmers 
here are afraid of the WUA/JVA. Farmers don’t call to complain because 
it’s mostly the smaller, weaker guys who have complaints and they know 
that they can’t combat the wasta of big farmers who can just make a quick 
phone call to fix their situation. 
 
In an undemocratic culture, people’s self image becomes that of clients, whose 
patrons need to be benevolent out of some internal calling and moral imperative 
rather than accountability to the people. The political culture coupled with the 
nature of the Jordanian state as a centralized monarchy is going to be one of the 
main impediments towards the WUAs realizing their full potential. The potential 
is not just in terms of more efficient and equitable water distribution or even in 
better system management and financial return, but also in terms of the creation 
of an institutional space for social organization. The potential is recognized by 
the WUA membership as well and is a cause for some pessimism on their part. 
Some WUA members because they see the future of the WUAs tied in with the 
evolutionary trajectory of the Jordanian state: 
 
There was talk of several WUAs coming together [as a confederation] to 
share facilities and maintenance crews, but the associations can not 
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become a political entity. You don’t find much of a civil society or 
volunteering culture here [in Jordan], for the fear of it turning political. 
There is always a fear [on part of the state] of creating a space, which 
could be politicized. The WUAs could be that space and hence there will be 
limits to what it can do (Farmer, PS 91. 23/08/2014). 
 
Conclusion:  
 
In Jordan It has been argued elsewhere that social capital is a meso level concept. 
It draws attention to mechanisms through which people with less power gain 
more power and find avenues for enhancing livelihoods, managing resources, 
negotiating power relations, expressing subjectivity, and attempting to affect 
change within specific social structural conditions (see Mustafa and Qazi 2007). 
WUAs as an example of induced social capital seem to havedespite being an 
international donor driven institutional innovation, on balance, have a positive 
effect in terms of enhancing livelihoods and allowing for more efficient and 
possibly equitable resource managementallowing collective bargaining and 
addressing water users’ concerns. They do seem to do a good job of preventing 
water stealing downstream from the pump stations, even if they turn a blind eye 
to stealing directly from the KAC. In this sense, the WUAs enablehave a good 
effect on the rearticulation of farmers’ subjectivity in terms of a collectivity 
rather than individuals. Therefore, there is less stealing from within the 
community but a continued sense of entitlement when it comes to stealing from 
the state. As one farmer said: “[Thanks to the WUA] farmers now feel shame 
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about stealing water [from other farmers]” (A tenant farmer at PS 95, 
24/08/2014). Another said: 
 
I understand when farmers put pipes into the KAC because water is 
needed.  I also do not have a problem with farmers taking water like this 
directly from the KAC because that’s taking from the JVA and the 
government.  I would have a problem with anyone taking water from 
within the PS 41 system because that would be like stealing from other 
farmers.  But taking from the KAC is different.  In fact, I have a small 
“house” pipe taking water directly from the KAC (A farmer at PS 41. Circa 
Aug. 2014). 
 
But given the social structural conditions within which WUAs operate, their 
affect on negotiating power relations can be seen at two levels—power between 
the state and the society, and internal power relations within the society. The 
WUA has a positive role in the JV in terms ofon negotiatingevening out power 
relations between the state and society—and therein lies the positive valence of 
the social capital that inheres in WUAs. However, the WUAs evidentlyseem to 
also legitimize existing intra-societal and class power relations, though at the 
same time making them more transactional rather than simply patronizing or 
predatory. PAnd perhaps that too is a partial positive outcome. 
 
Is Jordan a water scarce country? From most popular points of view it is. But 
water scarcity in Jordan is not an absolute, unmediated or hard reality. The 
argument of this article is that to insist upon absolute scarcity is not an apolitical 
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fact but a position with deep political resonance—absolute scarcity is in fact, a 
Malthusian shibboleth—useful in ferreting out the Malthusians today, as other 
shibboleths were useful in finding other Jewish or members of the same tribe in 
the region in antiquity. If there was absolute scarcity, then Jordan has done all 
that it can do for demand management and must turn to supply enhancement as 
the only way. The Jordanian water managers are, therefore, right. But if water 
scarcity is a politically-mediated reality, then a wider trope of interventions 
might suggest themselves. This is not to deny the reality and urgency of the 
political compulsions that mediate the scarcity but rather to point towards 
political levers through which those mediations and policy distortions can be 
addressed. 
 
The connection between macro-level water politics and local level water 
management mediated by WUAs is quite stark. Some of the larger farmers in the 
valley were not averse to speaking of Israelis admiringly in terms of giving a fair 
deal to all their farmers. The same farmers were also engaged in stealing water 
on the Jordanian side. But their view was that if everybody followed rules, they 
would too and if nobody did, then they wouldn’t either. The Jordanian state, 
however, captive to its logic of state-building and balancing multiple ethnic, 
tribal and even geopolitical interests, does not feel secure enough to fulfill the 
criteria set out by the farmer for a fair deal for all. But along the way, the 
Jordanian state may also have to constrict the space for the crystallization of 
politicsized social capital around WUAs to maintain the balancing act. That will 
be unfortunate because Eexplicit politicization of the WUAs will entail making 
making them a conduit for the water users for negotiating their rights and status 
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as citizens with the state. It will be unfortunate if that were not allowed--and it is 
not being allowed--as that will enable the will allow this induced social 
capitalWUAs to finally fulfill theirits potential to provide a space for 
substantively negotiating power relations  with the state and articulating socio-
political subjectivityand articulating socio-political subjectivity. WUAs’ promise 
can never just be limited to water—and it would be a shame if were. 
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Figure 1: A general map of Jordan Valley with landuse. 
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Figure 2: Schematic of Jordan Valley water management system. 
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Figure 3: An illegal water pipe syphoning water directly from the King Abdullah 
Canal. 
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Figure 4: An angry farmer and dismissive ditchriders at a WUA office. 
